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Abstract: The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) builds on a
tradition of gradually increasing federal involvement in the nation’s public
school systems. NCLB both resembles and differs from earlier federal
education laws. Over the past five decades, conservatives in Congress
softened their objections to the principle of federal aid to schools and
liberals downplayed fears about the unintended consequences of increased
federal involvement. The belief in limited federal involvement in education
has been replaced by the presumption by many legislators that past federal
investments justify imposing high stakes accountability requirements on
schools.

I.

Introduction

It is not difficult to imagine [the Department of Education] establishing national
“advisory” standards at some point in the future. Later, the department could
require adherence to the compulsory standards, if Federal aid is to be continued.
Next, standard tests, developed by the Federal Government, could be mandated to
check whether the compulsory standards are being met. Last, State and local
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authorities will be coerced into acceptance of a standardized curriculum as the “only
possible” guarantee of meeting compulsory standards.
-–Senator Harrison H. Schmitt (R-NM) during consideration of a proposal to
establish the U.S. Department of Education, Congressional Record, 1978, p. 299.
The operation and oversight of public schools in the United States is typically the
responsibility of states and local communities. Throughout most of the nation’s history, the
federal government was not expected to play a major role regulating or directly financing
schools. Even though important types of federal support for schools and for the principle
of education date to the beginning of the Republic, there is not much agreement as to what
educational role, if any, the founders intended the national government to play. Similarly,
most politicians and citizens accept federal involvement in schools today, but how extensive
that role ought to be is still subject to lively debate. Federal interest in schooling, combined
with the rhetorical truism of a limited federal role, injects recurring ideological tension into
20th and 21st century education proposals before the United States Congress.
At present, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) is the most visible
incarnation of federal education policy. The polarizing law has attracted attention because of
the new requirements it imposes on schools, school districts, and states. Indeed, NCLB is
difficult to understand in the context of limited federal involvement in the nation’s schools.
NCLB extends certain federal aid precedents established by earlier policies. It also departs
from these precedents in important ways, thereby setting precedents of its own.
The purpose of this paper is to systematically analyze the No Child Left Behind Act
in light of the federal aid traditions it builds on. The new law impels historians and policy
analysts to reassess the political and ideological justification for federal involvement in
education. Under NCLB, the federal government has placed itself at the center of a high
stakes accountability system for all schools.
The paper is divided into four sections. Following this introductory section, an
overview of NCLB is presented in the second section. Because NCLB builds on and departs
from several federal aid precedents, it is important to understand its basic features. It is also
necessary to clearly document the legacy of federal involvement in the decades prior to the
new law. This documentation is provided in the third section. The final section is a
discussion of the themes that emerge from the author’s analysis of NCLB in the context of
federal involvement in schools since 1958. NCLB’s most significant effect has been to
disrupt the traditional ideological balance between the federal government doing too much
and doing too little in the nation’s schools.
A few other introductory comments are needed. First, this paper focuses on the
education-related deliberations of the United States Congress. The sources of information
about these deliberations are committee and subcommittee hearings, committee reports, and
formal floor debates in the House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate. There are many
other perspectives about federal involvement in schools (e.g., state and local education
agencies, the courts), but Congress is the most visible arena for this debate, as well as a rich
database of education proposals and votes. Because the House and Senate are ostensibly
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representative, the concerns of state and local constituents are aired through the testimony
of members or committee witnesses. Moreover, proposals before Congress are lightning
rods for interest groups’ opinions and arguments. In sum, Congressional debates and
actions provide an ample record of the federal role in education over time.
Second, the No Child Left Behind Act is a relatively new law. It has attracted a lot
of attention, but it is not yet fully implemented. (For information on the early
implementation of NCLB, see Sunderman and Kim, 2004 and Center on Education Policy,
2004.) Hence, it is not yet possible to determine whether the new law is a coming to pass of
earlier warnings of federal control. Nevertheless, the debate and passage of NCLB is an
important chapter in the politics and ideology of federal education policy. NCLB’s strong
support from conservatives appears to signal the end of the long era when conservatives
could be counted on to oppose proposals to expand federal interference in schools.
Third, the terms “liberal” and “conservative” are used in this paper to give more
precise meaning to legislators’ ideological dispositions. Party affiliation (i.e., Democrat,
Republican) does not do as good a job as the ideological terms “liberal” and “conservative”)
in determining the likelihood of legislators to support or oppose education proposals in
Congress. For example, Southern Democrats tended to oppose federal education proposals
in the 1950s and ‘60s even though Democrats from other regions supported these proposals.
Of course, the ideological shorthand of “liberal” and “conservative” can be misleading. The
labels do not necessarily correspond to all the actions and opinions of liberal and
conservative legislators, especially since 2001. Nevertheless, distinction works well as a
reference point for describing the range of ideological opinion on federal education policy
over time. [Note 1] When there is a division between liberals and conservatives, it is usually
because different beliefs, values, and assumptions make up their respective world views.

II.

Overview Of The No Child Left Behind Act Of 2001

NCLB was debated and passed by Congress in 2001 and signed by President George
W. Bush on January 8, 2002. The law reauthorized (and renamed) the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act (ESEA), which was originally enacted in 1965. Although the new
law retains ESEA’s longstanding emphasis on improving the academic performance of
disadvantaged (i.e., poor) students, it adds significant accountability requirements for all
schools and school districts that receive federal funds, not just those schools with high
concentrations of poor children. When the law is fully implemented, schools, districts, and
states will have to meet “adequate yearly progress” criteria for student performance and all
teachers will have to be “highly qualified” in the subjects they teach.
As in past reauthorizations of ESEA, Title I is the centerpiece of NCLB. Most of
the act’s funds and notoriety are focused here. Title I lays out a variety of new requirements
aimed at “improving the academic achievement of the disadvantaged.” States are required to
define standards and develop assessments in math and reading for grades 3-8. Although
these requirements are consistent with trends in standards-based assessment that predate
NCLB, the new law has turned them into a nationwide high-stakes accountability system.
Schools must demonstrate adequate yearly progress (as defined by states) for all elementary
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and secondary students and student subgroups, including ‘‘economically disadvantaged
students,” students from major racial and ethnic groups, students with disabilities, and
‘‘students with limited English proficiency” [P.L. 107-110, Sec. 1111(b)(2)(C)(v)]. Using
achievement scores from the 2001-02 school year as the baseline, all students are expected to
reach proficient levels on state assessments by 2013-14.
Schools that do not make adequate yearly progress in meeting proficiency levels on
state assessments are identified as being “in need of school improvement.” School districts
and states can also be flagged for improvement based on aggregate scores. The law includes
a few due process provisions for schools identified for improvement, but little flexibility on
timelines or consequences. For schools that fail to make progress, a sequence of corrective
measures must be taken by the school district, including providing the option for students to
transfer from the school in need of improvement to another public school within the district
[ibid., Sec. 1116(b)(1)(E)(i)]. Consequences for schools that continue to struggle increase
over time: supplemental services (e.g., subsidized tutors) for students in identified schools
and, later, reorganizing the school (or local educational agency) that remains in need of
improvement. Finally, Title I also establishes the Reading First and Early Reading First
programs to support early literacy activities.
Title II, “Preparing, Training, and Recruiting High Quality Teachers and Principals,”
includes various teacher training and recruitment programs, along with specialized
curriculum programs like civics education and “teaching of traditional American history.”
Title II also includes teacher liability protection. Title III covers “language instruction for
limited English proficient and immigrant students” and Title IV authorizes or reauthorizes
several school-level programs such as “safe and drug-free schools and communities,” and
“21st century community learning centers.” In addition to the school choice provisions of
Title I, Title V is focused on “promoting informed parental choice” by means of the charter
schools program, magnet schools assistance program, and voluntary public school choice
program. Title V also includes more than a dozen “innovative programs” such as character
education partnerships; smaller learning communities; community technology centers; and
“Educational, Cultural, Apprenticeship, and Exchange Programs for Alaska Natives, Native
Hawaiians, and Their Historical Whaling and Trading Partners in Massachusetts.”
Title VI encompasses several programs under the aegis of flexibility and
accountability, and establishes new mechanisms for state and local flexibility and
“transferability” of certain federal funds. Title VII organizes programs for Indian, Native
Hawaiian, and Alaska Native education and Title VIII covers the impact aid program (i.e.,
funds for school systems impacted by the presence of non-taxpaying federal installations).
Several miscellaneous provisions and assurances are made throughout the legislation,
including a “prohibition against federal mandates, direction, or control” (ibid., Sec. 6301),
“prohibition on [federal] endorsement of curriculum” (Sec. 9527[b]), and “prohibition on
federally sponsored testing” (Sec. 9529).
Throughout the congressional deliberation of the NCLB bills, several conservatives
argued that past federal investments had not improved school performance and that it was
time to hold the public education system to a substantially higher standard. This logic
underlies the shift away from the ideology of limited federal involvement made by many
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conservatives during this period. Sen. Judd Gregg (R-NH) made the following claim during
the Senate floor debate of NCLB.
We have spent $120 billion in the last 35 years on title I, directed at trying to help
low-income kids. The result of those expenditures has been that low-income kids are
reading two grade levels below their peers and are graduating from high school at
half the rate of their peers. There has been absolutely no academic improvement in
those kids over this 35-year period. In the last 10 years, when we spent the most
amount of money, the academic improvement also has not increased at all.
(Congressional Record, 2001, p. S6064)
This language was part of Sen. Gregg’s larger argument for the bill’s ill-fated private school
voucher proposal. However, he and other legislators used the same argument to justify
NCLB’s new accountability requirements.
Many of the provisions of NCLB build on earlier federal laws. Several of these
laws—and their connection to NCLB—will be presented in the next section. At the same
time, the assessment, accountability, and teacher qualification requirements in Title I and
Title II of NCLB are significant new developments in federal policy-making for education.
More importantly, the new law departs from the concept of limited federal involvement that
was the hallmark of most earlier education policies. By strongly supporting NCLB,
conservatives in Congress have either temporarily or permanently abandoned their
traditional opposition to the expansion of federal involvement in schools. The ideological
meaning of NCLB will be developed in more detail in the remaining sections of this paper.

III.

Federal Involvement In Schools Before 2001 And What It
Meant For The No Child Left Behind Act

Exclusion of the federal government from either direct activity or any form of
control over local educational policy was a principle established quite early in
American history. ... The history of government and education in the United States
is, in great part, a history of the development of federal stimulatory activities with the
simultaneous limitation of the possibilities for federal control.
—Daniel J. Elazar (1962), The American Partnership, p. 244
If you think you are seeing something for the first time, you are probably wrong.
Historians can usually document precedents, precursors, or exact duplicates of the ideas we
think of as “new.” Readers interested in the history of federal education policy must go all
the way back to the 18th century to capture all of the precedents and traditions for American
education policy. In this section of the paper, I present an abbreviated survey of federal
education laws starting in the late 1950s. Please be aware, however, that federal interest in
education, as well as the principle of limited federal involvement, predates the 1950s by a
century or more.
Because NCLB both builds on and departs from the precedents established in the
long history of federal support for schools, it is important to clearly understand the law and
its post-World War II precursors. Again, the following overview is not exhaustive, but I
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believe it will provide sufficient detail to help the reader place NCLB into appropriate
historical context. The lessons to take from the federal laws described in this section are as
follows:
•
•
•

In Congress, there is an ideological and political distinction between acceptable and
unacceptable education policies.
Congressional interest in schooling, combined with the widespread belief that the
federal role in education ought to be limited, exert opposite ideological pressures.
The gradual expansion of federal assistance to schools laid the foundation for
NCLB, grounding the apparently revolutionary aspects of the law in an evolutionary
process.

Several federal education laws stand out as precedents for NCLB and as components
of the federal involvement context generally. These laws are the National Defense
Education Act of 1958 (NDEA), the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
(ESEA), the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (P.L. 94-142), the 1979
Department of Education Organization Act, and Goals 2000: Educate America Act of 1994.
These episodes are important because they expose contrasting ideological and political views
about federal involvement in education. In addition, they each provide modern precedents
for some of what is seen later in NCLB.
In most of these episodes, supporters of federal aid to education in Congress were
typically liberals and Democrats. Opponents to federal aid were usually—but not
always—conservatives, Republicans, and Southern Democrats. Liberals frequently
defended school aid as a necessary and appropriate role for the federal government.
Conservatives (and others) were often concerned about the threat of federal control of
schools when they opposed these proposals. In several of the laws and debates that
predate NCLB, ideologically and politically acceptable modes of federal involvement
were developed through the interaction of conservative and liberal values and beliefs.
The constructive tension between supporters and opponents of federal involvement kept
the federal government from doing too much or too little in the nation’s schools. Hence,
federal subsidies for schools serving disadvantaged youth have been acceptable for the
past four decades, whereas unrestricted payments to private schools are usually out of
bounds.
The National Defense Education Act of 1958
Federal aid to education which, today, shows up on the floor of the House in a space
suit will appear tomorrow in a surgeon’s gown, next year in a professor’s robes, and
the year after that in an engineer’s tweed suit. There is no end to disguises available
and likewise no end to the spending possibilities of this masquerade. The taxpayers
are not amused.
—Representative Charles B. Brownson (R-IN) during floor debate
on the National Defense Education Act (Congressional Record, 1958, p.
16695)
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I begin my overview of the recent history of federal aid to education with the
National Defense Education Act of 1958 (NDEA). NDEA is best remembered as a math
and science program, although it also provided loans to college students, fellowships to
graduate students, and funds for foreign language instruction for elementary and secondary
school students (Carlson, 1959, pp. 4-18). It capitalized on widely held concerns about the
educational and technical superiority of the Soviet Union, and on the growing belief that a
relatively restricted program of federal assistance to K-12 schools was legitimate. [Note 2]
NDEA breached the ramparts of strong and effective opposition to increased federal
assistance to schools. One of the reasons NDEA succeeded was because its proponents
respected the rhetoric and reality of limited federal involvement in schools. The law
delivered federal funds to elementary and secondary schools and to institutions of higher
education for specified purposes, a type of assistance that has come to be known as
“categorical aid.” Bills to authorize unrestricted payments to schools (also known as
“general aid”) were successfully opposed, before and after NDEA was enacted.
NDEA is an important part of the context for NCLB because it provided the
winning strategy of the first Elementary and Secondary Education Act in 1965. (NCLB is
the seventh reauthorization of ESEA.) Another key feature of NDEA was that the debate
revealed explicit arguments about the need for federal aid to schools. NDEA proponents
exploited Cold War concerns about U.S. competitiveness, communism, Soviet Sputnik
launches, and earlier momentum favoring expanded federal aid to schools. These proNDEA arguments took into account—and overcame—arguments from those opposed to
the principle of federal involvement. Proponents of the legislation prevailed by respecting
the concerns of federal aid foes and by advocating incremental expansion of federal
involvement. The strategy is noteworthy because it worked. The NDEA bill actually
passed, an unusual distinction for education legislation in the 1950s.
Despite the historical significance (and success) of the legislative strategy underlying
NDEA, it is important to remember that federal aid opponents were still a potent force in
1958. Their influence would wane over the next four decades, but they voiced their
arguments and helped limit the scope of federal assistance by systematically registering their
objections to NDEA and later legislative proposals. Federal aid opponents cited the threat
of federal control embodied in the NDEA bill, a familiar ideological objection to all forms of
federal education aid. Brigham Young University president Ernest Wilkinson, for example,
made the following statement to the House of Representatives subcommittees on special
education and general education in 1958.
I am afraid of the disintegrating erosion of particular exceptions, and by that I mean
that we legislate one day and say “We will do this, but we will have no Federal
control. Another day we will do this and we will have no Federal control.”
Ultimately, it mounts up so much that there has been so much erosion that we do
have Federal control. (U.S. House of Representatives, 1958, p. 449)
To conservatives in the 1950s, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 would have
looked like a very strong form of federal interference. Indeed, according to the foes of
federal aid in the 1950s, ‘60s, and ‘70s, the threat of federal control was insidious because it
was being imposed incrementally. What makes NCLB especially interesting vis a’vis the
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federal control threat is that the expansion of federal involvement embodied in the 2001 law
was advocated by a conservative president and strongly supported by conservative
legislators. The expansion of federal involvement occurred so gradually that many of those
who opposed the principle in earlier debates came to embrace it by 2001.
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
When you get this money in successive years and you come down and ask for more,
we are going to put strings on it, more and more. We are going to tell you what we
think you should do as educators. You are not only going to deal with your State
people, you are going to deal with the Federal people. I think you should understand
this and have your eyes wide open, too.
--Representative Charles Goodell (R-NY) addressing a panel of Catholic
educators during House subcommittee hearings on the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act (U.S. House of Representatives, 1965, p. 596)
Building on the precedent of the National Defense Education Act, the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) dramatically increased federal support for K12 education. When ESEA was first enacted, it was the cornerstone of federal involvement
in elementary and high schools. Congress has since enacted other policies, at least one of
which is as visible as ESEA (i.e., the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975-P.L. 94-142, now known as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act). As indicated in
the previous section, NCLB is the current reauthorization of ESEA.
ESEA is best remembered for Title I: “Financial Assistance to Local Educational
Agencies for the Education of Children from Low Income Families.” The other Titles of
the 1965 act included supplementary support for school libraries and instructional materials
(Title II), supplementary educational centers and services (Title III), educational research and
training (Title IV), grants to strengthen state departments of education (Title V), and general
provisions (Title VI). With the exception of final appropriations, the enacted law was
essentially the same as what was proposed by the administration. The administration’s bill
was conceived largely by President Johnson’s 1964 Task Force on Education chaired by
John W. Gardner. Gardner was later named Johnson’s secretary of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (Bailey and Mosher, 1968, chapter II; Meranto, 1967;
Eidenberg and Morey, 1969. See also “Report of the President’s Task Force on Education,”
1964).
Unlike NDEA, ESEA was a lineal ancestor of NCLB. The original legislation was
an outgrowth of President Lyndon Johnson’s domestic “War on Poverty.” NCLB retains
the ostensive antipoverty focus of ESEA. Yet, several things changed in the 37 years that
separated the two statutes. For example, the objections that had to be overcome were
different in the two eras. In 1965, the use of education as an antipoverty strategy was a new,
untested, and controversial idea. By 2001, no one challenged the antipoverty rationale of
NCLB. [Note 3] Instead, the controversial elements of NCLB were accountability, private
school choice, and the adequacy of the funds authorized by the act.
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In addition to being remarkably durable, the original ESEA is noteworthy because of
the extent to which the bill’s supporters manipulated potential opponents to federal school
aid. The election of 1964, in which President Johnson overwhelmingly defeated Sen. Barry
Goldwater (R-AZ), also made the 89th Congress a very liberal assembly. Nevertheless,
conservative opposition to federal involvement in education was still strong. Remaining
opponents could be outvoted only if several key compromises were included in the ESEA
bill. ESEA supporters faced what was certainly a smaller cadre of hard-core opponents to
the principle of federal aid than existed just a few years earlier. However, potential
opponents—those legislators who would oppose any education proposal that did not meet
their political needs—were vocal during the interval between NDEA and ESEA. (‘Potential
opponents’ were also present in the 2001 NCLB debate. Many Democrats might have
abandoned the bill if President Bush and the bill’s Republican managers hadn’t retracted the
private school voucher proposal.)
What were the issues that would have collectively (or individually) mobilized enough
opposition to kill the ESEA bills? The issues were labeled ‘the three Rs—race, religion, and
reds’ by many commentators. The race question was not an explicit part of the 1965 debate,
mainly because the 1964 Civil Rights Act addressed nondiscrimination and charged the
Department of Justice (not the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) with
enforcing its provisions. “Religion” meant federal dollars for parochial schools, which
although more controversial than today, had become politically necessary by 1965. “Reds”
meant “federal control,” a charge that, in the view of ESEA’s authors and managers, was
mitigated by defining Title I and the laws other provisions as categorical aid.
Of course, not everyone was convinced by the arguments in favor of ESEA nor by
its careful design. This skepticism was especially true with regard to the assurances that the
law would not lead to federal control. Of particular relevance today were warnings about the
future threat of federal control embodied in the law’s provisions. Representative William H.
Ayres (R-OH), for example, “deplore[d] the use of such a worthy objective [“helping the
educationally deprived child”] as a cloak for their attempt to create the first step for
bureaucratic Federal control of the education of our children” (Congressional Record, 1965, p.
5748). Rep. Donald D. Clancy (R-OH) claimed the ESEA bill was a manifestation of federal
control (as opposed to a federal control threat). “Under this legislation, decision-making
with respect to course content, curricula, instructional materials and professional standards
for teachers would be centralized in the U.S. Office of Education” (ibid., p. 5980).
A final feature of ESEA helps today’s readers understand the meaning of NCLB. It
is what I call the “federal control paradox” and it was a component of the arguments made
against ESEA in 1965 (and against earlier education proposals). We already know there were
widespread claims that federal control would automatically result from any attempt at federal
regulation. Sen. Absalom W. Robertson (D-VA) expressed the structural inevitability and
paradox of federal control during Senate floor debate: “not only does Federal control follow
Federal funds, but it is the constitutional duty of a Congress which appropriates Federal
money to supervise its expenditure” (ibid., p. 7523). The situation is paradoxical because
federal control (which is abhorred by all) is a logical consequence of the responsibility the
national government must assume to ensure that education dollars are used for the purposes
intended by Congress. The situation is simultaneously contradictory and inevitable,
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according to some legislators, and begins the moment federal funds are spent on schools. At
the time, many conservatives believed that this paradox could be avoided only by defeating
the ESEA bill. By the time the NCLB debate occurred, conservatives were less squeamish
about exerting strong federal influence over schools. Hence, the federal control paradox of
earlier debates was replaced by the less paradoxical—but still respectably conservative—
assertion: “After spending $125 billion of Title I money over 25 years, we have virtually
nothing to show for it.” [Sen. William Frist (R-TN), quoting Education Secretary Roderick
Paige in Congressional Record, 2001, p. S3935].
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
[The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975] contains a vast array of
detailed, complex, and costly administrative requirements which would unnecessarily
assert Federal control over traditional State and local government functions. It
establishes complex requirements under which tax dollars would be used to support
administrative paperwork and not educational programs. Unfortunately, these
requirements will remain in effect even though the Congress appropriates far less
than the amounts contemplated in S. 6.
—President Gerald R. Ford (1975), signing the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act under protest. (A veto by him would
have been overridden by Congress.)
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (P.L. 94-142) was a
milestone for children with disabilities, civil rights, and the federal regulatory presence in
education. The legislation spelled out detailed due process and administrative requirements
for educating children with disabilities. The protections provided by the law were overdue,
given the number of children with disabilities who received little or no schooling in the mid1970s. At the same time, the federal government took bold new steps into the nation’s
schools and classrooms. The tension between the principle of educational opportunity for
students with disabilities, the definition and enforcement of these rights by the federal
government, and the cost of providing them has been continuous in the three decades since
this law passed.
When P.L. 94-142 passed, it was an anomaly. Like ESEA, it has been reauthorized
numerous times since 1975, so some of its novelty has worn off. Unlike ESEA, however,
federal protection for the rights of children with disabilities has become more controversial
over time. P.L. 94-142 and its four reauthorizations have become the classic educational
“unfunded mandate,” thereby fulfilling scattered but prescient concerns in the original
debate about who would pay for the high costs of implementing the law. (Other legislators
worked to reduce the federal cost so as to increase its chances of passing and surviving
President Gerald R. Ford’s threatened veto [Anderson, 1997, pp. 78-79].) From the federal
perspective, the special education mandate is a cost effective way to enforce a moral vision.

Anderson: Legacy of federal aid to education

11

For my purposes, a second cluster of anomalies stands out: P.L. 94-142’s high level
of federal prescriptiveness AND the nearly unanimous support it received in both chambers
of Congress. Perhaps most anomalous of all, the law’s momentous implications for federal
interference with state and local school systems were ignored in the original debate.
Several of these unusual features are present in NCLB: widespread belief that it
imposes unfunded mandates on states and school systems, especially in connection with
testing; a highly prescriptive approach that departs in many ways from past federal practice;
and overwhelming support in Congress when the law was first enacted. The lesson from
both episodes is that political pressure can and does overturn the ideological status quo of
federal education policy. How could a legislator oppose the education of handicapped
children in 1975 or leave even one child behind in 2001?
Finally, recall that children with disabilities make up one of the subgroups for which
adequate yearly progress must be reported under NCLB. Supporters of the new law have
portrayed its subgroup accountability requirements as a continuation of the federal role in
protecting the civil rights of children with disabilities, English language learners, and
disadvantaged students. P.L. 94-142 and ESEA set the federal civil rights enforcement
precedents for NCLB.

Establishing the Department of Education in 1979
To me, the creation of this Department [of Education] provides a potential for a
centralization of the control of ideas, a potential which may or may not be realized
but one which will be latent for as long as the Department exists. And, as we all
know, where there is potential for a thing to be done, there are eventually people
who attempt to realize that potential for whatever purposes—good or evil.
--Rep. William S. Moorhead (D-PA), dissenting from the House
Committee on Government Operations recommendation to establish
the U.S. Department of Education (U.S. House of Representatives,
1979, pp. 1161-1162)
By the late 1970s, the number and total size of federal education programs had
grown to such a degree that policy-makers started to argue that these activities should be
consolidated in a cabinet-level department of education. It was also a 1976 campaign
promise by Jimmy Carter to the National Education Association in exchange for its
endorsement. Despite its ostensibly nonideological reorganization rationale, the proposal to
create the Department of Education (ED) generated political and ideological controversy.
Supporters of certain education programs did not want to alter existing relationships in the
bureaucracy. Others feared that the federal government was positioning itself to take
control of the schools. The 1970s Department of Education debate turned into a
thoroughgoing reexamination of the federal role as it had evolved to that point.
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Conservatives and liberals voiced several warnings about the threat of federal control
during the ED debate, including detailed descriptions of the mechanism of federal
domination. Sen. Harrison H. Schmitt (R-NM), for example, described an alarming sequence
of events leading from the Great Society to the creation of ED and to federal control
through fiscal dependence.
During the last decade, the Federal Government has become more and more
involved in education. What started out as assistance, primarily financial assistance,
to State and local authorities, has emerged as de facto control through the threat of
withholding funds upon which local systems had become dependent. The creation
of a department of education obviously will strengthen this trend toward centralized
decisionmaking in the field of education. (Congressional Record, 1978, pp. 298-299)
Traditional differences between liberals and conservatives were discernible during
the ED, debate but they were not as clear cut as they had been during the 1950s and ’60s.
Numerous liberal Democrats, such as Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY), opposed the
measure, which they saw as a scheme to centralize federal education authority. Many
conservatives shared this view. Many liberals also worried that the federal commitment to
civil rights would be compromised by locating enforcement programs in an agency
controlled by professional educators. (Some conservatives also claimed to have this
concern.) Other conservatives, namely Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-SC), were vocal supporters
of the reorganization plan (ibid., p. 374).
What does the decision to establish ED tell us about the historical context of NCLB?
The relationship between the two episodes is less obvious than between, say, ESEA and
NCLB. Nevertheless, the connections are important. First, the NCLB measure received
strong, bipartisan support. Indeed, NCLB appears to have generated less ideological and
political controversy than the ED decision, making NCLB resemble the strongly supported
P.L. 94-142. The relatively unpredictable behavior of Congressional liberals and
conservatives with respect to the ED decision signaled the possibility that conservatives
could become supporters of certain kinds of federal education policies. NCLB was
advanced by a conservative president with strong, bipartisan support. Without the long
track record of expanding federal involvement and the softening of traditional ideological
positions during the same period, NCLB may not have been possible.
Until recently, ED was an ideological lightning rod. Conservatives—including
President Ronald Reagan—immediately attempted to dismantle the new department and
they have only recently backed away from this goal. Signaling his intention to become an
education activist, presidential candidate George W. Bush had to lobby to remove a plank
calling for the elimination of ED from the 2000 Republican platform (Rudalevige, 2003, p.
34). Again, it was a significant development for a bona fide conservative to advocate
increased federal involvement in schools.
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Goals 2000: Educate America Act
It is really tragic that we have gotten so emotionalized in America that people
actually believe Goals 2000 is part of some plot by the federal government to seize
control of education. It’s hard to fathom how someone could be that illogical.
—Delegate C. Richard Cranwell, Virginia House Democrat,
commenting on Republican Governor George F. Allen’s decision to
decline Goals 2000 funds (Bradley, 1996, p. 14)
Goals 2000, which passed in 1994, is an important precedent for NCLB because it
introduced many of the same legislative and educational objectives as the 2001 law. Put
forward by liberals and Democrats, the Goals 2000 proposal faced withering criticism from
conservatives during the debate and after it passed. In 1996, two years after it was enacted,
Congress and the Clinton administration were forced to retreat from several key provisions
of the largely symbolic law. Conservatives have embraced NCLB, but it is possible that the
same political and ideological controversies that gutted Goals 2000 may also pose problems
for the full implementation of NCLB.
The Goals 2000 legislation originated at the bipartisan Governors’ Education
Summit in Charlottesville, Virginia, in 1989. There, the assembled governors set the six
original national education goals. President George H. W. Bush failed to win Congressional
approval for America 2000, a standards-based school reform package similar to Goals 2000.
Congressional Democrats and the Clinton administration were more closely aligned
ideologically, and the legislation fared better. Nevertheless, Goals 2000 generated
controversy during and after passage.
Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA), chair of the Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, gave a concise rationale for S. 846, the early Senate version of the legislation that
was to become Goals 2000.
By codifying the National Education Goals, this legislation will strengthen our
commitment to reach them. By providing for the development and certification of
voluntary standards for learning in seven basic sources—math, science, English,
history, foreign languages, art, and geography—this legislation will help to end the
growing confusion about what students should be learning in their classes. (U.S.
Senate, 1993a, p. 1)
The eight national education goals were codified in Title I of the final Goals 2000
law, P.L. 103-227. Title II spelled out duties of the new National Education Standards and
Improvement Council (NESIC) and the existing National Education Goals Panel. From the
standpoint of states and everyone else, Title III was most prominent because it authorized
funds for state and local systemic improvement grants. Title V established the National
Skills Standards Board and other workplace programs, and the Office of Educational
Research and Improvement was reauthorized in Title IX. NESIC and all of Title III were
the most controversial parts of Goals 2000 before and after passage of the act.
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Title III’s provisions for state and local grants required states to submit formal plans
to ED. In conjunction with the goals panel and NESIC, the department would approve
these plans if they showed reasonable promise of success and reflected a standards-driven
school improvement strategy for all K-12 students. As a condition of receiving Goals 2000
grants, states were directed to either adopt “voluntary national model” curriculum and
performance standards and “opportunity-to-learn standards or strategies” or devise their
own. The national standards were to be “certified” by NESIC and “approved” by the goals
panel. NESIC was also charged with certifying state content standards and performance
assessments, if states chose to submit them. Despite assurances of the voluntary nature of
some of these certification procedures (and the option for states to decline moneys under
Title III), advocates of Goals 2000 were never able to quell objections to the law’s
requirements for federal approval of state curriculum, performance, and opportunity-tolearn standards.
Some of the same controversies have dogged both Goals 2000 and NCLB. Again, it
is too early to tell what effect NCLB’s lingering controversies will have on full
implementation of the law, but the experience of Goals 2000 may be instructive. For
example, resource adequacy issues were contentious during both debates. “Opportunity-tolearn standards or strategies” were controversial under Goals 2000 because they would
supposedly be used to determine the adequacy of state and local support for education.
During the NCLB debate, many liberals criticized what they believed to be inadequate
funding for Title I and other programs such as special education. Liberal (and conservative)
criticism of the law’s funding levels has persisted since it was enacted.
Although resource issues remained controversial in the interval between Goals 2000
and NCLB, another issue—accountability for results—became somewhat less controversial
and actually made it into the final NCLB statute. In 1994, a minority of Goals 2000
supporters wanted federal dollars to be tied to actually meeting state performance standards.
Rep. Jack Reed (D-RI) introduced an amendment to the House of Representatives version
of the bill (H.R. 1804). He wanted to ensure that standards would be met, not just set:
This provision asks States, if they choose to apply for Federal planning grants under
Title III of Goals 2000, to describe in their application what they will do when a
school or school system fails to meet the standards. ...
We should not sit idly by during this reform debate and watch Federal
resources go into another paper drill which will enrich educational consultants and
only coincidentally help students because we do not face the tough question of what
actions must be taken to ensure that standards are met. (Congressional Record, 1993, p.
H7752)
Even though Reed’s amendment did not make it into the final version of the Goals
2000 law, it is worth noting that at least some legislators in 1994 were interested in
accountability requirements with teeth. It is especially interesting to recall this aspect of the
Goals 2000 debate in light of NCLB’s adoption of a high-stakes accountability system for
schools, districts, and states.
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Finally, Goals 2000 demonstrates that federal education legislation can pass with
political support but questionable ideological legitimacy. [Note 4] It is possible that NCLB
will face the same pressures as it nears full implementation and more of its consequences are
realized. Future Congressional action to soften or repeal NCLB notwithstanding, the federal
government is setting assessment policy for elementary and high schools for the first time.
Some aspects of these new requirements have been seen before, such as the state plans and
standards that were part of Goals 2000 (and the 1994 reauthorization of ESEA—the
Improve America’s Schools Act). NCLB took some of the voluntary elements in these 1994
laws, expanded them (e.g., by adding student testing requirements), and made them
mandatory in 2001-02. Again, the new assessment policies remain controversial and it is
possible that certain NCLB provisions will be repealed or softened by later Congresses.

IV.

How Radical a Departure is NCLB From Past Federal
Education Policies?

As we have already seen, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 both builds on and
departs from previous federal education policies and principles. NCLB injected federal
regulations into more schools and districts than earlier laws, in addition to setting high
expectations for students and teachers. NCLB did this by putting the federal government at
the center of the movement for standards-based accountability. Although neither federal
involvement in education nor high-stakes accountability are new ideas, they have been
combined in NCLB in important new ways.
This concluding section develops two political themes and one ideological theme
synthesized from the No Child Left Behind Act and the legacy of federal involvement in
schools. The political themes, such as presidential leadership, illuminate some of the
political issues underlying NCLB and earlier laws. The ideological theme highlights the
deeper significance of NCLB in the evolution of federal education policies. NCLB is a
political phenomenon with rich ideological meaning.
Political Theme #1: Presidential backing of federal education laws is neither
necessary nor sufficient to pass them, but it can help.
This is a straightforward lesson from the history of federal education policy-making
(and federal policy-making generally). Active presidential backing can motivate Congress to
pass important education laws. President Lyndon B. Johnson campaigned on his
commitment to increasing federal aid to schools and his administration devised a winning
formula for delivering federal dollars to virtually every school district in the country. The
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 also respected the tradition of limited
federal involvement by earmarking the bulk of federal dollars to serve schools with high
concentrations of poor students. Almost four decades later, George W. Bush campaigned
on his commitment to education generally and on the purported gains students had made
while he was governor of Texas. Two Texans, one liberal and one conservative, made—and
delivered on—education-related campaign promises. ESEA and NCLB were touted for their

Education Policy Analysis Archives Vol. 12 No. 24

16

potential to remake the landscape of public education. Again, both laws were shaped and
aided by their White House backing.
Of course, presidential support is not necessary for key education laws to be passed.
President Gerald R. Ford opposed the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
(P.L. 94-142) and would have vetoed it if it hadn’t had almost unanimous support in
Congress. Nor does presidential support guarantee success, as was the case with President
Ronald W. Reagan’s desire to enact a constitutional amendment permitting school prayer in
1984. Both President Jimmy Carter and President Bill Clinton won educational victories in
Congress (establishing a cabinet-level Department of Education and passing Goals 2000,
respectively), but the resulting laws came under fierce ideological attack. In the case of
Goals 2000, the original law was partially overturned by a later Congress.
This paper is not primarily concerned with the dynamics of presidential leadership in
education, but the topic deserves further study. NCLB is a strong law that passed with
strong support in Congress and the White House. However, it may turn out to be as
ideologically or politically controversial as earlier laws once it is more fully implemented.
During the 2004 presidential campaign, several Democratic presidential candidates, including
most of those candidates who voted in favor of it as legislators, were very critical of NCLB.
Political Theme #2: Both NCLB and P.L. 94-142 are charged with being unfunded
mandates because of the mismatch between funding levels and the costs incurred by
their requirements.
The main point here is that the unfunded mandate charge against NCLB is not
unprecedented. When P.L. 94-142 passed in 1975, it was a breathtaking expansion of federal
influence over local educators. It also passed along most of its costs to states and school
districts, a fact that received little attention when the law was enacted. Since passage,
however, the law has become the poster child for unfunded mandates. The federal
government has been repeatedly criticized for being unwilling to meet the funding levels
originally envisioned in P.L. 94-142. The issue was debated at length during consideration of
NCLB in 2001.
Like P.L. 94-142, NCLB critics accused it of spawning many unfunded mandates,
especially with regard to the cost of fulfilling the law’s testing requirements. More
significantly, concerns about inadequate funding for Title I almost derailed the Senate bill,
although it later passed that chamber by a huge margin. Hence, the unfunded mandate
charge was leveled at NCLB more vocally than at P.L. 94-142 during the original debate. In
neither case, however, has inadequate federal financing for the ambitious purposes of the
original laws led to reductions in their reach. Over the past 29 years, it has become more
acceptable for the implementation costs of federal education policies to be passed down to
states and school districts. (This phenomenon contrasts sharply with the entitlement flavor
of federal aid beginning in the 1960s. In the context of the federal entitlement environment,
it is worth noting that P.L. 94-142 and NCLB were ideological and regulatory anomalies
when they were first enacted.)
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Ideological Theme: Over time, there has been a gradual weakening of the
traditional ideological divisions between liberals and conservatives in Congress with
regard to federal education aid.
The weakening of these divisions has both obvious and not so obvious implications
for NCLB. Consider, for example, the similarities between P.L. 94-142 and NCLB in the
previous theme. Both laws passed by huge margins, and with the support of legislators in
both parties. A related but subtler fact is that very few conservative legislators opposed
either law. That is, both laws represented significant expansions of federal authority for
education, yet they were not widely opposed on ideological grounds.
Now consider the bruising debate of President Carter’s proposal to establish ED.
Several liberal legislators opposed the creation of ED and at least one conservative registered
his enthusiastic support for the measure. Taken together, the bipartisan roster of ED foes
demonstrate that liberals and conservatives can argue against excessive federal involvement
in schools. Similarly, conservatives can support the expansion of federal action, as
demonstrated by the votes on P.L. 94-142 and NCLB.
Finally, notice a few things about NCLB. A handful of prominent liberals [e.g., Sen.
James Jeffords (I-VT)] opposed NCLB on political grounds. Another handful of
conservatives [e.g., Rep. Tom DeLay (R-TX)] opposed the law on ideological grounds. (For
the final NCLB vote in the House and Senate, see Congressional Record, 2001, p. H10112 and
p. S13422, respectively.) Nevertheless, the strong support by conservatives for NCLB is
powerful evidence that the rhetorical truism of limited federal involvement in schools has
been either temporarily or permanently overturned. A generation earlier, both liberals and
conservatives would have been much more likely to emphasize the need for limits to the
federal presence in schools. Moreover, conservative support for a law like NCLB would
have been inconceivable.
The weakening of traditional ideological positions on federal education questions
disrupted the balance between the federal government involving itself too much or too little
in the nation’s schools. The ideological tension between conservative support for limited
federal involvement and liberal support for certain types of federal action in schools was a
constructive force. It is likely that the excesses of NCLB are due to the earlier success of
liberals in expanding the scope of appropriate federal action in schools AND to the gradual
acquiescence of conservatives to this expansion.
Of course, there are still types of federal action that are ideologically “out of
bounds.” NCLB sponsors, for example, were unable to pass the block grant and private
school voucher components of the original bill. (Both vouchers and block grants are very
appealing to conservatives.) Likewise, liberals were also unable to obtain federal funds for
school construction projects and class size reduction. The long-term viability of the
controversial features of NCLB is still being determined, and ED has already loosened
certain regulations relating to “highly qualified teachers” in rural areas, testing participation
rates for students, and the participation of English Language Learners in mandated testing.
Does conservative support for the expansion of federal influence over schools mean
that conservatives have abandoned their principles? Not necessarily. In response to
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several decades of steadily increasing federal aid to schools, conservatives have
supplemented their earlier warnings of federal control with other principles. In the case of
NCLB, these principles included fiscal conservatism generally and ‘not throwing good
money after bad.’ Once NDEA and ESEA breached the ramparts of effective opposition to
federal aid, conservatives could (and did) invoke the track record of federal spending in later
debates. Conservatives and Republicans portrayed the results of the decades of spending
under ESEA in an extremely negative light as a justification for adding an unprecedented
high-stakes accountability component to NCLB. A newer conservative principle—giving
taxpayers at all levels their money’s worth—has overshadowed the nostalgic preference for
limited federal involvement.
Notes
Some of the historical research reported in this paper was conducted for my dissertation at
the School of Education at Stanford University (Anderson, 1997). I wish to thank Daniel
Humphrey of SRI International and Kara S. Finnigan of the University of Rochester for
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
[1] “Liberal” and “conservative” labels are best defined in relation to each other. For
example, some researchers rely on annually calculated “liberal quotients” from the liberal
interest group Americans for Democratic Action to place individual legislators on a
continuum running from 0 (most conservative) to 100 (most liberal). For analyses of ADA
scores for several of the episodes described in this paper, see Anderson (1997).
[2] Aid to colleges and college students was more widely accepted at the time. Recall the
popularity of the Veterans Readjustment Act of 1944 (better known as the “G.I. Bill”).
[3] In the 1965 law, poverty was operationalized as an extremely broad category, thereby
distributing Title I funds to every state and congressional district, virtually every county, and
the vast majority of the nation’s school districts (Meranto, 1967, p. 5). The broad
distribution of Title I funds remains one of the laws most attractive features to legislators
and educators alike.
[4] Another example of a short-lived federal education policy was the establishment of a
cabinet-level Department of Education in 1867. The proposal passed but concerns about
federal control persisted and the department was downgraded the following year to a bureau
in the Department of the Interior (Lee, 1949, pp. 21-28; Peskin, 1973).
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